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INTERNATIONAL LAW AS LAW

PROF. DR. SOMPONG SUCHARITKUL

I.

INTRODUCTION

The title of this address: “International Law as Law,” appears at first
sight to beg several fundamental questions. To discuss “international
law” qua “law” initially requires a common understanding of the term
“law,” or to be more precise what is meant by “law” for the purpose of
the current study. Without embarking on the perennial quest for a
universal definition of “law,” it may suffice for practical purposes to
refer even superficially to the variety of schools of thought on the
definition of “law.” The term “law” cannot be taken for granted, as there
are so many known definitions of “law” in the study of jurisprudence, or
the philosophy of law, legal science or general principles of law. Once it
is agreed as to which definition of “law” or which school of
jurisprudence is adopted or to be followed, for the present purpose, the
answer to the question whether international law is, or can at all be
regarded as “law” may be attempted more meaningfully. This may well
depend, as it surely does depend, on the actual definition of “law,”
employed in the exercise.
By way of illustration, some of the more notable schools of jurisprudence
offering concrete definitions of “law” may be considered, as they may

1. Keynote address presented by Professor Dr. Sompong Sucharitkul, D.C.L. (Oxon), Dean
of the Faculty of Law, Rangsit University, Bangkok, Thailand at the 19th Fulbright Symposium at
Golden Gate University School of Law on April 3, 2009.
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provide different answers to the question of the “lawness” of
international law as law.
One of the most prominent analytical schools of jurisprudence that
attracted the attention of jurists in the past one hundred years or so was
the Austinian theory of law, defining ‘law” as a “command” issued by
one political superior to a political inferior or subordinate, with a
sanction attached in the event of failure to obey or abide by the
“command.”2 This command theory of Austin’s definition of law was
prevalent for some time, until discredited by a number of convincing
objections and reasons given by subsequent commentators. While the
Austinian definition of “law” was in vogue, it was relatively certain that
“international law” did not and could not qualify as “law.”
For one thing, “international law” could scarcely be regarded as a
command, nor could there be a political hierarchy, neither a political
superior nor subordinate, as States are equal in the eyes of international
law. Besides, there seemed to be a marked absence of sanction in
international law to the extent that “international law” appeared
outwardly to lack lawness without any effective sanction.
In this particular context, circumstances may have considerably, if not
fundamentally, changed over the past one hundred years. A “command”
that used to be the source of authority from a political superior, issued to
a subordinate from an Austinian perspective, may find more comparable
concrete examples in a variety of resolutions of the Security Council of
the United Nations which could create binding legal obligations on
member states of the United Nations. While states remain equal in the
eyes of international law, international bodies or agencies have been
established which appear to have been vested with superior, if not supranational, authority. It is no longer absolutely certain that if Austin were
alive today, he could not have defended his definition of law as not
precluding the “lawness” of international law, as a source of international
obligations flowing from a supra-national world body, entrusted with the
exercise of some semblance of a kind of legislative, executive and even
judicial power with some tangible forms of sanction attached in the
eventuality of non-compliance. Even enforcement measures are no
longer inconceivable within the framework of the United Nations.

2. See, e.g., John Austin and W. Jethro Brown, The Austinian Theory of Law: Being an
Edition of Lectures I, V, and VI of Austin’s “Jurisprudence” and of Austin’s “Essay on the Uses of
the Study of Jurisprudence”with Critical Notes and Excursus, John Murray, Albemarle Street,
London, 1906, p 331.
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“International law” appears more likely to be considered as “law” in the
eyes of other schools of jurisprudence such as the historical or
sociological school. Examples of relevant schools of jurisprudence
include Sir Henry Maine’s “Ancient Law,’ Sir Paul Vinogradorff’s
“Historical Jurisprudence,” or the Realist School of Jurisprudence.
Additional schools of jurisprudence include the Pure Science Theory of
Law as proposed by Professor Hans Kelsen, or the Natural Law school of
jurisprudence prevalent in ancient Rome as reported by Classical Roman
Jurists like Ulpian and subsequently advocated by European jurists such
as Duguit. Other than the analytical school of Austin, “international
law” has incurred no negative reception in any definition of “law.”
Even in other analytical schools of jurisprudence, the lawness of
international law seems apparent. Take for example, an analytical
definition of “law,” suggested by Dr. Arthur Goodhart, Master of
University College, Oxford University, Professor of Jurisprudence, an
American graduate of Yale University School of Law, and for longer
than three decades, Editor in Chief of the English Law Quarterly Review.
In one of his memorable classes on jurisprudence almost six decades ago,
Dr. Goodhart once offered a more pragmatic definition of “law” from his
own school of thought, which could well be classified as “analytical”.
According to Professor Goodhart, “law” can be defined as “a body of
rules recognized as binding within an organized society.”3 His
description of law as a collection or body of rules is readily and clearly
visible. His reference to the subjective element of “recognition as
binding” signifies acceptance by members of the organized society as an
obligation incumbent upon its members, as well as upon the society
itself. The substance of the law or any rule of law may be altered by the
will of the society and its members, as the law itself as well as its rules
must necessarily grow and progressively develop to keep up with the
march of time. Similar to the mundane Buddhist philosophy which
manifestly admits the existence of the four fundamental truths, or the
four Ariya Sajja, namely birth, growth, illness or decay, and death or
disappearance, as the cycle of Samsara, any rule of law in any organized
society is bound to follow this inevitable cycle. A rule of law is born,
created or established; it is accepted in a society and grows or prospers in
its application. One day it will lose its attraction and binding character by
ailing, becoming sick, or falling into a state of decay, and will eventually
fade away or fall into desuetude, thereby following the cycle of Samsara.
Such rules of law which are no longer recognized by the community as
3. See, e.g., A.L. Goodhart, English Law and the Moral Law, Fred B. Rothman & Co.
Littleton, Colorado, 1988, p 19.
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binding will become obsolete or extinct, abrogated, superseded or
abandoned or otherwise replaced by different, more current, or even
contrary rules. A set of pre-existing rules may become obsolescent for
lack of sustained recognition or continuing practice and observance. It
may then remain on the decline and finally fall into disuse or oblivion, or
otherwise is substituted by another more updated and contemporary
version of the derelict set of rules. Such is the cycle of life and death for
any living breathing being, including any rule of law.
If international law is law as it appears to have been firmly established,
then international law qua law too must follow the same path of Samsara
as law. This accounts for the natural growth and progressive
development of international law. Accordingly, a rule of international
law, just like any rule of law, comes into being or becomes established in
the practice of states, further develops and grows in its acceptance by the
international community, and may one day lose its attraction or binding
force and fall out of practice and become no longer observed by states. It
may thus die a natural death or fall into disuse or become replaced by a
different rule of international law.
II.

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND NATIONAL LAWS

Once the lawness of international law is ascertained and proven beyond
dispute, the next series of burning questions to address and examine indepth concern the relationship between international law, the
international legal system and national laws, or any given national,
internal or domestic legal system. One question that deserves to be
clarified in the first place is whether international law is part of national
law or vice versa. To put it differently, it is questionable whether the
international legal system finds its place in any given national legal
system, or conversely whether a domestic legal system can be distinctly
recognized by or within the world legal order. The answers to these
questions may all be in the affirmative. Still, further questions need to be
raised and examined regarding the reciprocal relations between the two
legal systems.
It may be appropriate at this point to refer to two different approaches to
the relationship between the law of nations on the one hand and any
given national or federal legal system on the other. In this connection, it
would seem practical to start from a given national legal system, such as
the United Kingdom or the United States, to discover the proper place of
international law within a domestic or municipal legal system. Students
of international law in a common law system are likely to be familiar
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with the dictum of Lord Mansfield in Triquet v. Bath, (1764) 3 Burr.
1478, recalling observations by Lord Talbot, the Lord Chancellor in an
earlier case of Buvot v. Barbuit, (1735-37) Cas. Temp. Talbot 281-283,
declining jurisdiction against Barbuit, who was commissioned by the
King of Prussia in 1717 to do and execute what his Prussian Majesty
should think fit with regard to his subjects trading in England. Thus, the
theory of incorporation was introduced into English case law by English
courts incorporating customary rules of international law into the
common law, and supplemented in the field of diplomatic immunities by
the Statute of Anne (1708), Act for Preserving the Privileges of
Ambassadors, and other Public Ministers of Foreign Princes and States,
c.12, ss.1, 2 and 3. As the United States inherited the English common
law system upon attaining independence, the English doctrine of
incorporation was part and parcel of the heritage of the English common
law, complete with an incorporated body of customary rules of
international law.
In another closely related field of state immunity which in the English
practice was but a sequence of personal immunity of the sovereign, in De
Haber v. The Queen of Portugal, (1851) 17 Q.B. 171, Lord Campbell
C.J. said, at page 206-207, “ . . . To cite a foreign potentate in a
municipal court, for any complaint against him in his public capacity, is
contrary to the law of nations, and an insult which he is entitled to
resent.” In US practice, influenced in no small measure by the common
law doctrine of the immunity of the domestic sovereign and the impact of
the United States Constitution, American courts were the first, in point of
time, to formulate the doctrine of state immunity which has subsequently
been accepted in the general practice of states. The principle was earlier
lucidly enunciated by Marshall C.J. in The Schooner Exchange v.
M’Faddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) 7 Cranch 116, at pages 136-137, “… This
perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and this
common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an exchange
of good offices with each other have given rise to a class of cases in
which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise of a part of
that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has been stated to
be the attribute of every nation.” Like in the practice of the United
Kingdom, customary rules of international law have been accepted by
American courts as being part of the law of “our land.”
Other national jurisdictions which have not adopted the Anglo-American
doctrine of incorporation of customary rules of international law as part
of the corpus juris of their own national law may nevertheless recognize
the existence of a body of customary rules of international law, and
consider them, as in the case of Dutch courts, to be binding on their
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national judiciary. Other jurisdictions, such as the French and the Italian,
may have more or less explicitly provided for the application of
customary rules and principles of international law by national judicial
authorities.
To explore all the jurisdictions in the world is to enter another field of
international legal studies, namely comparative law. An in-depth
examination of comparative legal systems or the comparison of national
laws may lead inevitably to the question of choice of law in a given
situation. This will in turn lead to concurrent or partly overlapping areas
of legal studies, known as conflict of laws or more popularly in the civillaw jurisdictions, “Private International Law.”
From the perspective of international law or the world legal order, an
exploration of national legal systems is not only recommended but is also
beneficial and useful. To say the least, an examination of the laws of
each nation or several major nations of the world, will contribute to the
understanding of the process of the making of international law. The
sources of international law, as contained in Article 38 (1), (b), (c) and
(d) of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice, invariably
and expressly include references to national legal systems, such as “(b)
international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law,”
“(c) the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” or
“(d) . . . judicial decisions . . . of the various nations, as subsidiary means
for the determination of rules of law.” Each of these items is found in
the study of national legal systems.
Whatever the ultimate conclusion that may be reached regarding the
degree of usefulness of the studies of various municipal legal systems in
the search for the substance of rules of international law, there is a clear
need to learn about national laws to assist in the comprehension and
application of rules of international law. The intimate relationship
between international law and national or domestic laws are therefore
boundless and infinite. Their inter-connection is complex and intense to
such an extent that there seems to be very little difference in practice
between “monism” and “dualism,” nor indeed between the different
theories of “monism” or “dualism.” Whether international law and any
given national law can be seen as one or can co-exist peacefully as
distinct legal systems, appears to entail no significant or any material
difference in effect. Their intellectual discussion is nonetheless helpful
for a better and wider appreciation of their mutual needs and reciprocal
interchanges.
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III. IMPACT OF NATIONAL LAWS ON THE LAW OF NATIONS
As a natural consequence of an intensive mutual relationship,
international law has been inspired by national laws and has continued
progressively to develop from the practice of states. Hence from the
experience of national courts and national legal systems, including the
legislative and administrative authorities. International law cannot exist
without the international community or the family of nations. Within
each State there is a national legal system to provide the source of
inspiration for the livelihood of the law of nations, which continues to
grow from strength to strength, borrowing freely from national legal
systems whatever rule of law or general principle of law that may be
considered expedient and conducive to its growing status in dimension as
well as in volume and efficacy, including more effective implementation
of the evolving rules of international law.
Today the world has seen in active operation many international and
regional bodies at work singly and collectively in close collaboration to
enhance and strengthen the rules of international law. To mention a few,
apart from the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of
Arbitration in Hague which have been operative for many decades, there
are also in operation the United Nations Compensation Commission
(UNCC), the International Law Commission (ILC), the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the various International and Regional Criminal
Tribunals, and the GATT and the World Trade Organization (WTO).
There are a great many fascinating world bodies and regional agencies to
study in order to acquire a better understanding of international law in
full progressive development.
For all these and more, there is ample proof of the presence of
international law as law. International law has indeed become more
effective to such an extent that it is now clearly possible to speak of
effective remedies and the application of enforcement measures in the
form of sanctions in international relations. International law has been
reinforced by the collective will of the states as manifested in various
domains. For instance, in the field of recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards, adherence to the New York Convention of 1958
has done much to lend more meaningful strength to alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) in general and international arbitration in particular. If
international law itself is short of effective sanctions for want of an
international police force, this gap is more than fully compensated by the
willingness of enlightened national judicial authorities to give effect to
international awards and adjudications.
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Finally, international law has persisted, and will continue to prosper with
the continued and increasing support of member nations of the
international community who are currently enlightened by the realization
that a lawless world would imply an early termination of the world legal
order. Only international law and order will ensure the survival of
mankind against the background of scientific and nuclear research and
experiments that continue to threaten the stability and well-being of the
people of the world. What is urgently needed today is the awareness that
international law is law and must be regarded as such by the international
community and by each and every member of the world populace
without exception. If this address has led to that conclusion, the aims
and purposes of the present exercise may be said to have been fulfilled.
IV. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In the ultimate analysis, it is emphatically vital to reconfirm with
absolute conviction the original proposition that international law is law,
and that international law should be treated as law with all the attributes
of that notion. It is incumbent upon nations and people of the world to
add further strength and vitality to the rules of international law without
detracting from its lawfulness or legality. International law should be
devoid of the slightest trace of unlawfulness or illegality of any kind
whatsoever.
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